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 Comment and Reply
 PRICE BEHAVIOR IN A DYNAMIC OLIGOPSONY:
 WASHINGTON PROCESSING POTATOES -A COMMENT
 NATHALIE LAVOIE
 In a recent article in this journal, Richards,
 Patterson, and Acharya (RPA) evaluate
 whether the Washington State frozen potato
 processors behave as an oligopsony and de-
 termine the welfare loss associated with this
 market structure. For this purpose, the authors
 use the Green and Porter trigger price model
 of collusion. However, this article contains er-
 rors in the derivation of the industry aver-
 age conduct parameter and in the derivation
 and calculation of the loss in producer wel-
 fare. These errors make the article confusing
 and have important implications for the inter-
 pretation of the results and associated policy
 recommendations.
 The first mistake occurs in the derivation of
 the values of the industry average conjectural
 variation (CV) elasticity under different forms
 of firm conduct. CV is defined as
 dX
 (1) i dX= 1 + vi
 dxi
 where X is the industry output, xi is firm i's
 output, v, = N L', and xj = firm j's output.
 CVs have been the subject of both criticism
 and confusion in their interpretation.' First,
 the nomenclature "conjectural variation" in it-
 self is confusing because it has been used in the
 literature and textbooks to describe either Oi,
 dx, vi (Waterson; Jacquemin), or even 2(Kamien
 and Schwartz; Brander and Zhang). Second, as
 emphasized by both Bresnahan, and Perloff,
 the CV should not be interpreted in the same
 way in a theoretical versus empirical context.
 dxj In theory, ?x represents the "conjecture" of firm i regarding how firm j will react to an in-
 crease in quantity by firm i. Empirically, while
 early work gave a behavioral interpretation
 to the estimated value of Oi or "conduct pa-
 rameter," recent practice has been to interpret
 the conduct parameter as an index of market
 power that ignores the (unknown) game that
 firms play (Perloff).2'3 Finally, Corts demon-
 strated that Bresnahan's middle ground in-
 terpretation of the conduct parameter-firms'
 behavior is as competitive as if they held the
 conjecture implied by the estimated value-is
 valid only under a restrictive condition.4 Nev-
 ertheless, validations of the conduct parameter
 approach using direct measures of marginal
 cost to compute the "true" value of the con-
 duct parameter have shown that the method
 performs reasonably well for low levels of mar-
 ket power (Genesove and Mullin; Clay and
 Troesken).
 RPA model the profit-maximization prob-
 lem of a typical potato processor in an in-
 dustry characterized by oligopsony power. In
 this market structure, the notion of CV comes
 into play because firms are mutually interde-
 pendent in their actions. While the model is
 Nathalie Lavoie is assistant professor in the Department of Re-
 source Economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
 The author thanks Mingxia Zhang for verifying the derivation of
 equation (4). The author also gratefully acknowledges the helpful
 comments and suggestions of two anonymous reviewers and editor
 Ian Sheldon. Thanks also go to Tim Richards for his cooperation
 by providing the data used and the estimate of the beta parameter.
 However, all errors are the author's responsibility.
 1 See Carlton and Perloff; Kamien and Schwartz; Bresnahan;
 Jacquemin; Perloff; and Corts for the discussion of this topic.
 2 The terminology "conduct parameter" has been used generi-
 cally in the literature to describe the estimated value of either the
 CV (0,) or the CV elasticity (X M-L). I will use the term "conduct
 parameter" generically also.
 3 By expressing 0, in elasticity form, its interpretation as a mea-
 sure of departure from competition becomes clear. The Lerner
 index in this case corresponds to the CV elasticity divided by the
 elasticity of demand. Thus, the CV elasticity can be interpreted
 as an elasticity-adjusted Lerner index and provides a measure of
 market structure or departure from perfect competition (Perloff;
 Corts; Wolfram).
 4 Corts demonstrates that the estimated CV parameter measures
 the marginal, not average, collusiveness of conduct. Thus, market
 conduct inference is limited to cases where behavior in equilibrium
 is identical on the margin, not on average, to a CV game.
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 specified for a typical firm, only industry data
 are available-a common difficulty in this type
 of analysis. When only industry data are avail-
 able, Bresnahan argues that the aggregate con-
 duct parameter should be interpreted as the
 industry average conduct. It is in aggregating
 the firms' supply relation to obtain an industry
 average that an error occurs. This error leads
 to a misspecification of the benchmark values
 of the industry average CV elasticity against
 which the estimated parameters are compared
 to assess the degree of departure from compe-
 tition and the associated welfare loss. Thus, the
 interpretation of the results is affected by this
 mistake.
 When firms are not identical (the more gen-
 eral case), aggregating involves weighting each
 firm's supply relation by its market share and
 summing across firms (Porter 1983a; Goldberg
 and Knetter; Wolfram).5 When there are N
 identical firms, the market share of each firm
 is 1/N and aggregating is done by summing
 the supply relations over all firms and dividing
 by N (Perloff; Corts). RPA assume N identi-
 cal firms with the same marginal cost (cq), the
 same technology (X, the conversion rate of raw
 potatoes to french fries), behaving according
 to the same CV (0 defined as in (1)), and fac-
 ing the market supply curve w(X, z), where z
 is a vector of exogenous supply-shift variables.
 RPA then aggregate the first-order condition
 over N firms to obtain the intermediate step:
 N
 N(p - cq)h - Nw(X, z) - lO i xi = 0
 i=1
 where-q = and j=1 xi = X. Divide by N
 and rearrange to obtain a similar equation to
 equation (RPA5):
 pX-w(X, z) = CqkX + 0aX.
 This equation, however, differs from RPA
 in that Oa = = (1 + i dx) whereas
 N1 N j dx, 0RPA - = 1 + k i l, leading the authors to
 incorrectly specify the range of this conduct
 parameter. The above definition of 0a, when
 firms are identical and 0i = 0 for all i, is in
 agreement with the literature, e.g., Waterson;
 Perloff; Corts; and also Wolfram. The aggre-
 gation of the supply relationship from the firm
 level to an industry level changes only the inter-
 Table 1. Values of dx , 0, and On for Identical
 Firms under Different Forms of Firm Conduct
 Firm Conduct dx 0a dx,
 Perfect collusion 1 N 1
 Cournot competition 0 1
 Bertrand/perfect competition O0 0 N-1
 pretation of the conduct parameter to an "ag-
 gregate conduct parameter" (Corts, p. 231).
 In fact, the aggregate conduct parameter
 (0a) can be interpreted as the industry aver-
 age CV elasticity. The CV elasticity (dX xi)
 takes the form of 0/N when firms are identical
 (and Oi = 0 for all i) because each firm has a
 market share equal to 1/N. Table 1 summarizes
 the values taken by 3L, 0, and Oa under differ- ent forms of firm conduct. In a Cournot setting
 with identical firms, Oa takes the value of 1/N
 because each firm believes its rivals' quantity is
 fixed, i.e., dx = 0 and 0 = 1. As shown in the ta-
 ble, 0a ranges between 0 (perfect competition)
 and 1 (perfect collusion) and not between 0
 and 2 as claimed by RPA.6 The CV elasticity
 always ranges between 0 and 1.7
 It is important to correctly specify the values
 taken by the CV elasticity under the forms of
 conduct listed in table 1 because those values
 can be used as benchmarks to determine the
 extent of market power in the industry. For
 example, when there are five identical firms
 buying an homogeneous product, an estimated
 value of Oa greater than 0.2 but less than 1
 would imply that the level of market power is
 greater than that implied by Cournot compe-
 tition but less than under a joint monopsony
 5 Note that Porter (1983a) uses 0i to represent the firm's CV
 elasticity rather the CV defined in equation (1).
 6 RPA cite Brander and Zhang for the bounds of the industry
 average CV between 0 and 2. However, Brander and Zhang model
 an airline duopoly where they actually estimate each firm's conjec-
 ture (v,). CV (0 as defined in (1)) does vary between 0 and 2 for a
 duopoly, but not the CV elasticity.
 7 More generally, when firms are not identical and do not have
 the same conjectures, 0a = ,N s,20, where s, is the market share
 of firm i, 0, is as defined in (1), and s,O, is the general form of
 the CV elasticity (Porter 1983a; Goldberg and Knetter; Wolfram).
 Thus, 0a can be interpreted as the industry weighted average CV
 elasticity. It takes the values of 0, ENI_ st2(Herfindahl index), and1, under Bertrand/perfec  competition, Cournot competi ion, and
 perfect collusion, respectively. It can be seen that 0a=0/N is a spe-
 cial case of the general model and results from the assumptions
 of identical firms with identical conjectures. In this special case,
 the industry average CV elasticity (08) is the same as each firm's
 CV elasticity. See also Muth and Wohlgenant for the derivation
 and interpretation of the aggregate conduct parameter under two
 special cases.
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 or perfect cartel. Porter (1983a); Brander
 and Zhang; Deodhar and Sheldon; Genesove
 and Mullin; Wolfram; Sexton; and Clay and
 Troesken are examples of articles compar-
 ing or testing estimated conduct parameters
 against theoretical benchmarks or giving them
 an "equivalent number of symmetric Cournot
 firms" interpretation (i.e., N = 1/0a). Given
 that the trigger price model of Green and
 Porter and the one of RPA assume reversion to
 a single-shot Cournot-Nash equilibrium dur-
 ing punishment periods, it is imperative to
 compare the estimated level of market power
 under reversionary periods with this theoret-
 ical benchmark to evaluate the consistency
 of the results with the conceptual model.8
 From now on, I use the notation 0a defined
 above.
 RPA (personal communication) indicate
 that Oa was not restricted in their estimation to
 lie within any conceptual bounds. Thus, while
 the empirical estimates of 0a are not affected
 by this conceptual error, there are important
 implications for the interpretation of these es-
 timates of market power.
 The authors estimate the conduct parame-
 ters in the collusion regime to be 1.038 and
 0.861 in the punishment regime. Note that
 under the authors' derivation of the indus-
 try average CV elasticity, 0RPA = 1.038 would
 be roughly equivalent to Cournot competi-
 tion in the collusive regime. In contrast, their
 economic model, following Green and Porter,
 assumes that firms revert to Cournot competi-
 tion in the punishment regime. Under the cor-
 rect interpretation of the industry average CV
 elasticity, 0a, the estimates of the conduct pa-
 rameter under both the collusive and punish-
 ment regime mean a much higher degree of
 market power than implied by Cournot com-
 petition. Specifically, in collusive periods, Oa
 = 1.038 m 1.0 indicates that potato processors
 perfectly collude to maximize their joint profit.
 Even in the punishment regime (0a = 0.861),
 the departure from competition is much larger
 than predicted by the noncollusive Cournot
 scenario where 0a = 0.2 when N = 5, the um-
 ber of major players in the industry ccording
 to RPA, and it in fact represents behavior close
 to a joint monopsony.9 While 0a > 1, under the
 collusive regime, is not a problem in itself be-
 cause the estimate is probably not statistically
 different from one, Porter (1983b) shows "in
 general the optimal quantity in cooperative pe-
 riods will exceed that which would maximize
 expected oint net returns in any single period"
 (p. 314).1 This logic would imply that the con-
 duct parameter would normally be strictly less
 than 1, even in collusive regimes.
 It is a source of concern that such high de-
 grees of collusion are estimated under both
 regimes and, consequently, the results do not
 conform well to the trigger price strategy of
 collusion put forth by the authors. However,
 if one believes the estimated conduct param-
 eters, then the estimated degree of departure
 from competition indicates the presence of a
 powerful cartel and would likely warrant an
 antitrust investigation.
 The mistake in the definition of the bench-
 mark values of the industry average CV elastic-
 ity also has important implications for the in-
 terpretation of the magnitude of welfare loss in
 RPA's table 2.11 Given the extent of departure
 from competition implied by RPA's results, it is
 surprising that their estimate of producers' loss
 due to imperfect competition ($0.369 million/
 month) represents only 1.6% of the aver-
 age shipment value during the sample pe-
riod (when the supply flexibility (p) is 2.16).
 This percentage loss in producer surplus (PS)
is small relative to the theoretical prediction
 that can be derived. In deriving the theoreti-
 cal predictions, I have also found a mistake in
 equation (RPA18). In what follows, I rederive
 (RPA18) to develop theoretical predictions for
 the percentage loss in PS due to oligopsonistic
 power of potato processors.
 8 In collusive periods, the theory provides an expected range for
 the estimated value of the conduct parameter, i.e., greater than
 the value expected under the punishment period, but smaller than
 the value expected under static joint profit maximization (Porter
 1983a, Porter 1983b). In punishment periods, the theory provides
 a specific expected value for the conduct parameter, i.e., the value
 of the CV elasticity under the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium when
 price is the strategic variable, or the value of the CV elasticity un-
 der the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when quantity is the strategic
 variable. Price is the strategic variable in Porter's (1983a) model,
 and he explicitly compares the estimated value of the conduct pa-
 rameter under cooperation with both the Cournot benchmark and
 the expected range of this parameter to evaluate the consistency
 of the results with the conceptual model.
 9 It should also be noted that those estimates of CV elasticity
 are also large in the context of previous empirical research. Sexton
 and Lavoie's survey of the literature indicates that the measured
 departures from competition in the food processing industry have
 mostly been small with CV elasticities often below 0.2. This re-
 sult is true even in highly concentrated industries such as the meat
 processing industry where Azzam and Pagoulatos estimated the
 buyers' CV elasticity to be 0.223. See also table 1 of Sheldon and
 Sperling, which summarizes market power and Lerner index esti-
 mates in the food and related industries.
 10 Intuitively, colluding at a quantity higher than the monopsony
 quantity reduces the incentives to cheat on the agreement. The
 gains to cheating decrease as the colluding quantity increases for
 a given trigger price and length of punishment period.
 "1 Note that with 0a e [0;1], the last three columns of RPA's table 2
 are not relevant.
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 The expression for the marginal outlay
 (MO) curve is12
 (2) MO = (1 - a) [?XP + Oa (p + 1) pX.
 Note that this specification also implies that
 Oa ranges between 0 (perfect competition)
 and 1 (monopsony), because Oa can be inter-
 preted as a weight between the industry supply
 curve and marginal cost curve in determining
 the quantity purchased (Melnick and Shalit;
 Sexton and Lavoie). Moreover, two terms are
 missing in (RPA17), the equation that defines
 the difference in PS between competitive and
 oligopsonistic outcomes. It should read
 1 1
 (3) PSdiff = w(c -( P + 1 p+1I
 Wc Wc P
 Oap + 1 p(Oap + 1)
 wc
 (p + 1)(Oap + 1)
 W 1)
 X P(0a-p + 1) "
 Thus, the expected loss in PS when there are
 shifts in behavioral regime corresponds to
 ( s P we P
 (4) PSdiff =p 1 -) T -T
 p1+1
 1P +1
 and differs from (RPA18) by the factor P.13 Four alternative analytical expressions for
 the relative loss of producer welfare due to
 imperfect competition can be derived by divid-
 ing the expression for absolute producer loss
 in equation (3) by the expressions for (a) the
 12 This expression simplifies to MO = PXP + Oap PXP, where 3
 is a constant in the equation for inverse supply, and p replaces -q
 in RPA-a typo. To avoid confusion, readers should also note the
 typo in the definition of p on p. 266. As in Huang and Sexton, p
 represents a supply flexibility and should be defined as q , not 1.
 3 The omission of the factor P in (RPA18) cannot by itself ex-
 plain low measures of welfare loss. If RPA omitted the factor P
 in their calculation of producers' welfare loss, the correct numbers
 in table 2 of RPA would be lower, thus only reinforcing my obser-
 vation that the welfare losses are small compared to the theoretical
 predictions.
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 competitive PS, (b) the oligopsonistic PS, (c)
 the competitive producer revenue, and (d) the
 oligopsonistic producer revenue. These analyt-
 ical expressions appear in the first row of ta-
 ble 2. All expressions are a function of p and
 0a. Thus, they can be evaluated at the estimated
 value of p (2.16) and under a collusive (Oa =
 1.038) and a punishment (0a = 0.861) regime.
 Regardless of the measure used, the relative
 loss in PS is much larger than 1.6%, as cal-
 culated by RPA. I presume that the reference
 revenue used by RPA ("the average monthly
 value of producer shipments") represents the
 oligopsonistic producer revenue. However, the
 theoretical prediction suggests that the per-
 centage loss in PS should be between 250%
 and 314% relative to the oligopsonistic pro-
 ducer revenue, or at least $58.66 million per
 month. The predictions presented in table 2 are
 also consistent with those of Sexton who shows,
 using simulations based on linear demand and
 supply equations, that the loss in PS represents
 an important percentage of the competitive PS
 even at modest departures from competition.
 Note that the theoretical predictions de-
 pend on the estimated values of p and 0a, and
 the functional form assumption for the supply
 of processing potatoes. However, the relative
 welfare loss calculations also depend on the
 value of P, the value of the proxy for the com-
 petitive price of processing potatoes (wc), and
 the reference measure of producers' revenue.
 The value of the proxy is especially important
 for the calculation of welfare losses. Specif-
 ically, lower values of wc than that implied
 by the model would generate lower absolute
 and relative welfare loss than that predicted
 by theory. 14
 In summary, RPA estimated conduct pa-
 ramet s within a Green and Porter trigger
 pri  f amework of collusion to determine
 th  level of market power in the Washing-
 t  State potato processing industry. Errors in
 th benchmark valu s of he industry average
 conduct parameter affect the interpretation of
 t eir results. Specifically, I show that the es-
 ti ated val es of the conduct parameter im-
 ply a much larger degree of market power in
the potato processing industry than indicated
 by RPA. In fact, the results indicate that un-
 der collusive period , potato processors max-
 imiz  th ir joint profit as if they were acting
 as a monopsony. Even under the punishment
 regime, the conduct is close to perfect collu-
 sion with 0a = 0.861. Such a high level of de-
 par ure from compet tion should imply large
 welfare losses for potato p oducers relative to
 what would be attained under perfect compe-
 tition. I also show that the relative measure of
welfare loss calculated by RPA is sig ificantly
 lower than the theoretical predictions for this
 level of departure from competition.
 Thus, if the reader accepts the estimated val-
 ues of he conduct p ramet rs, the results of
 RPA suggest significant producer welfare loss
 due to the pre ence of a monopsony-like cartel
 in the potato proce sing industry. Given such
 anticompetitive be avior and associated loss
 in producer welfare, an antitrust investig tion
 would seem to be warranted. However, some
 reade s may not readily accept this onclusion
 without a clearer explanation of th  apparent
 inconsistencies noted here between the empir-
 ical results and the underlying th ory. In this
 case, further research should reinvestigate the
 degree of imperfect competition in the Wash-
 ington processing potato industry.
 [Received October 2003;
 accepted May 2004.]
 14 I find that the value of w, implied by the model is much higher
 than the value of the proxy used by RPA. RPA proxy the com-
 petitive price of processing potatoes (w,) by scaling downward
 the fresh market potato price series by 23% to take into account
 a conversion ratio of raw to processed potato of 0.5. The aver-
 age monthly price of fresh potatoes is $4.75/cwt (according to the
 data provided by RPA), thus the average monthly value of w, is
 $3.66/cwt. According to the data provided by RPA, the average
 monthly shipments of processed potatoes is 4.738 million cwt. Pre-
 sumably, those shipments represent oligopsony quantities (Xm).
 Knowing that the quantity determined by oligopsonists is found
 by equating the perceived marginal outlay expression (2) with
 marginal value product (we in RPA's setup), we can get an idea
 of the magnitude of w, implied by the model using the estimated
 values for p (0.539), p (2.16), and oa under punishment (0.861) and
 collusion (1.038). Those calculations reveal that the magnitude of
 wc implied by the model is between $44.37 and $50.31 per cwt,
 which is more than ten times higher than the values used by RPA
 ($3.66/cwt on average). Thus, a possible explanation for the low
 magnitude of welfare loss compared to the theoretical prediction
 is the difference between the average value of the proxy for wc
 used by RPA and the value implied by the model at the estimated
 parameter values.
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